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A unique human characteristic is our ability to mind wander – a state in which we are
free to engage in thoughts that are not directly tied to sensations and perceptions from
our immediate physical environment. From a neurocognitive perspective, it has been
proposed that during mind wandering, our executive resources are decoupled from the
external environment and directed to these internal thoughts. In this review, we examine an
underappreciated aspect of this phenomenon – attenuation of sensory-motor processing –
from two perspectives. First, we describe the range of widespread sensory, cognitive
and motor processes attenuated during mind wandering states, and how this impacts our
neurocognitive processing of external events.We then consider sensory-motor attenuation
in a class of clinical neurocognitive disorders that have ties to pathological patterns of
decoupling, reviews suggesting that mind wandering and these clinical states may share
a common mechanism of sensory-motor attenuation. Taken together, these observations
suggest the sensory-motor consequences of decoupled thinking are integral to normal and
pathological neurocognitive states.
Keywords: mind wandering, decoupling, sensory attenuation, cognitive attenuation, executive resources,
neurocognitive pathologies
Mind wandering is the ubiquitous phenomenon in which our
minds drift away from perceptual and cognitive demands of the
immediate external environment to focus on the internal milieu.
From planning for the weekend to fantasizing about our next
vacation, we easily get lost in our own thoughts, especially when
performing well-practiced tasks such as driving or washing dishes.
In these instances, our minds become decoupled from stimu-
lus events in the external environment, a regular and periodic
experience that occupies a notable portion of our mental life
(e.g., Klinger and Cox, 1987; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Indeed, our proclivity to mind
wander is sufﬁciently hard-wired that despite the best of our will
power, these “decoupled” thoughts occur whether we want them
to or not (Braboszcz et al., 2010).
A key issue in the scientiﬁc study of mind wandering con-
cerns understanding the qualitative content of decoupled thoughts
(McVay et al., 2009; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood
et al., 2011). For example, in terms of what our minds focus on
when they wander, we are more likely to think about the future
than the past or present, an effect that has been linked to strategic
planning (Smallwood et al., 2011). These task-unrelated thoughts
are also more likely to concern personal issues instead of unfo-
cused daydreams (McVay et al., 2009), underscoring their utility.
Further, when mind wandering in their daily lives, individuals also
report being less happy, regardless of whether their thoughts were
unpleasant or neutral (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). These
ﬁndings andothers have all helped elucidate the nature of thoughts
inside the wandering mind.
Notably, however, the consequences of mind wandering extend
beyond the qualitative content of decoupled thinking itself, and
the adaptive value it provides our species (for a review, see
Schooler et al., 2011). In particular, there has been growing
interest in understanding the impact decoupled thinking has on
how we process and respond to stimuli in the external envi-
ronment (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008; O’Connell et al., 2009;
Barron et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), an issue that is
pressing for two central reasons. From a basic cognitive neu-
roscience perspective, mind wandering is now being recognized
as a novel form of attentional selection, where our attention
to the outside world is disrupted, such that we no longer
highlight or “select” certain external stimuli for preferential neu-
rocognitive processing (e.g., Kam et al., 2011). Likewise, from a
clinical perspective, abnormal patterns of mind wandering and
their effects on attention to the external environment have been
implicated in conditions such as attention deﬁcit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) and depression (e.g., Sonuga-Barke and Castel-
lanos, 2007). Taken together, these considerations have placed
a premium on elucidating the details of how mind wander-
ing alters our neurocognitive processing of external stimulus
events.
Importantly, discussion of these sensory-motor effects also
helps to illuminate current models of mind wandering themselves.
To the point, there has been a growing debate over exactly how
sensory-motor processing should be affected as one slips into a
mind wandering state. On the one hand, the “decoupling hypoth-
esis” predicts that the maintenance of self-generated thoughts
should attenuate the sensory-motor processing of external events,
owing to the fact that these thoughts, and the subjective experi-
ences they invoke in particular, rely on the same domain-speciﬁc
processes engaged by events in the external world (e.g., Smallwood
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and Schooler, 2006; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2013). Con-
sistent with this view, visual (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1997), auditory
(e.g., Zatorre andHalpern,2005), andmotor imagery (e.g.,Decety,
1996) have all been shown to activate the majority of domain-
speciﬁc regions of cortex activated during actual sensory-motor
engagement with the outside world. In this view, self-generated
thoughts would have the same impact of sensory-motor regions
of cortex as active imagery itself, leading to a general attenu-
ation of processing of external events during mind wandering
episodes.
On the other hand, the “executive failure hypothesis” pro-
poses that mind wandering is the direct result of an inability
to maintain selective attention to current task-relevant goals in
the external environment (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009, 2010;
Smallwood, 2013). This has led to the suggestion that, when these
executive processes fail during mind wandering, the concomi-
tant “release” of selective attentional control over sensory-motor
processing should lead to either no changes, or perhaps even
increases, in task-irrelevant external stimulus processing (Small-
wood, 2013). Consistent with this perspective has been the ﬁnding
that when executive processes such as working memory are over-
loaded by extreme task demands, selective attention does appear
to fail, producing increases in the processing of task-irrelevant
information in the external environment (e.g., de Fockert et al.,
2001). With mind wandering, the idea here is that when exec-
utive processes fail and a mind wandering episode is initiated,
task-irrelevant external events that were heretofore suppressed
via top-down executive control are now processed to a greater
extent.
Given these competing predictions regarding how mind wan-
dering should impact sensory-motor processing, our review
provides direct support for the sensory-motor predictions of the
“decoupling hypothesis.” While it remains uncertain whether the
attenuation effects we report are in fact driven by engagement
of these sensory-motor processes by self-generated thought as
the hypothesis predicts, the attenuation itself is consistent with
that prediction. With respect to the “executive failure hypothe-
sis,” however, we believe the prediction of unchanged or increased
sensory-motor processing during mind wandering (Smallwood,
2013) may not in fact be tenable. Instead, one can reconcile
the “executive failure hypothesis” with widespread sensory motor
attenuation if one assumes that once engaged in self-generated
thought, this would have an attenuating impact on sensory-
motor processing regardless of whether selective task-related
attention is released. In both cases, however, consideration of the
sensory-motor consequences of mind wandering help illuminate
important questions to consider for models of mind wandering in
general.
Overall, the sensory-motor attenuation effects of mind wan-
dering ripple widely, extending to a broad array of neurocognitive
functions and systems. Below, we begin by reviewing these effects,
concerning the idea that decoupled thoughts are associatedwith an
attenuation of processing in neural systems that are often engaged
or “coupled” with the external sensory-motor environment in
order to adaptively guide our behavior. We then consider patholo-
gies of neurocognitive function that may be tied to abnormal
patterns of decoupling. Following this, we conclude by pointing
out methodological and theoretical considerations and directions
for future investigations.
WHICH NEUROCOGNITIVE FUNCTIONS ARE ATTENUATED
DURING THE DECOUPLED STATE?
Attenuation of sensory-motor processing of stimuli in the envi-
ronment appears to play an important role in facilitating the
production andmaintenance of ongoing decoupled thoughts (e.g.,
Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2013). Given themyriad of infor-
mation that can capture our attention and the limited resources
available, normal functioningwould require thatwe suppress goal-
irrelevant events in the immediate environment to focus on the
relevant ones. As support for the executive function model (Small-
wood and Schooler, 2006), we summarize evidence suggesting
that during mind wandering, executive resources are decoupled
from our immediate environment and directed them to inner
streams of thoughts via this global sensory-motor attenuation.
Based on our review of the literature, we suggest that the atten-
uation of external processing plays an important role in mind
wandering, an idea that is supported by a recent theoretical paper
(Smallwood, 2013).
Before detailing speciﬁc effects, however, there are at least two
key points to consider. First, the attenuating effects of mind wan-
dering on sensory-motor processing are multi-faceted, in that
they occur at multiple levels of processing and disrupt various
types of stimulus-related responses. Gathering evidence fromboth
neural and behavioral investigations, mind wandering has been
associated with reduction in sensory and cognitive processing of
external inputs, as well as changes in the accuracy and variabil-
ity of response in attention and motor task performance. Second,
for any given system or process attenuated by mind wandering, the
magnitude of the effect can be graded. That is, the effects can range
from partial attenuation, reducing the extent of stimulus process-
ing but not eliminating it, to full-blown attenuation of external
stimulus processing. In this section, we outline what has been dis-
covered about the functional consequences of mind wandering in
terms of sensory-motor attenuation, with a particular emphasis
on the event-related potential (ERP) studies we conducted over
the last several years.
MIND WANDERING ATTENUATES COGNITIVE PROCESSING
Attentional lapses have been shown to disrupt behavioral perfor-
mance, yet the neural mechanism underlying this process has been
unclear. To examine this issue, Weissman et al. (2006) had par-
ticipants perform a global/local task during which their reaction
times (RTs) and neural activity (i.e., functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, fMRI) were recorded. Using a behavioral measure,
they considered slower RTs to relevant stimuli as an index of atten-
tional lapses. During these momentary lapses in attention, cortical
regions involved in attentional orienting, working memory and
conﬂict resolution were found to down regulate (Weissman et al.,
2006).
Given these ﬁndings, to what extent do the reduced levels
of activation in the brain correspond to a dampened cogni-
tive analysis of external events during mind wandering episodes?
Based on past observations that simple tasks elicit high levels
of mind wandering (Teasdale et al., 1993; Giambra, 1995), our
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study asked participants to perform the sustained attention to
response task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997), where they simply
responded to frequent non-targets and withheld their response to
an infrequent target (Smallwood et al., 2008). To examine how
SART performance was modulated by attention to task, mind
wandering episodes were deﬁned by two approaches – an objec-
tive behavioral error measure, indexing the inability to withhold
responses to the infrequent target, and a subjective measure in
which subjects verbally report their task-related attention state in
the moment as “on-task”or “mind wandering.”We recorded ERPs
during the task, and focused our analysis on the P3 ERP com-
ponent elicited by the frequent non-targets, a component which
indexes the depth of cognitive analysis of stimulus events (Polich,
2007). Speciﬁcally, we examined the P3 as a function of whether
the frequent non-target preceded “on-task” or “mind wandering”
reports.
We found an attenuation of the P3 to the frequent stimuli in the
interval immediately preceding subjective reports of mind wan-
dering episodes, as shown in Figure 1A. Further, a comparable P3
reduction was observed in the period immediately prior to perfor-
mance errors. These ﬁndings indicate that the extent of cognitive
processing during episodes of mind wandering appears to imitate
periods leading up to performance errors, suggesting the overall
lower level of cognitive analysis of external events may be tightly
linked to disruptions in task performance (Smallwood et al., 2008).
As such, it appears that cognitive processing was indeed attenuated
during episodes of mind wandering as indexed by both objective
and subjective measures, and that this attenuation effect can be
accurately indexed by subjective reports of task-related attention
(Smallwood et al., 2008).
These ﬁndings were replicated by O’Connell et al. (2009), who
attempted to identify neural signatures of lapses in sustained atten-
tion. In their study, participants were asked to identify the “target”
visual stimulus, which was presented for a longer duration relative
to the standard visual stimulus. They examined the ERP responses
to the targets prior to behavioral measures of attentional lapses,
which were indexed by the failure to detect targets. They found
a reduced P3 and contingent-negative variation (CNV), an ERP
component that reﬂects themagnitude of an anticipatory response
to an expected stimulus, for up to 4 s prior to missed targets. This
implies a disruption inboth target anticipation anddisengagement
from ongoing task while in the decoupled state.
If episodes of mind wandering attenuate cognitive responses,
however, is this attenuation effect restricted to task-relevant
processing only, or is there a general attentuation on cogni-
tive processing of external inputs regardless of their relevance?
To address that question, Barron et al. (2011) asked partici-
pants to perform a visual oddball task, which required them to
manually respond to the task-relevant oddball, and ignore the
task-irrelevant novel stimuli that acted as distractors, both of
which occurred at low frequency. The participants were cate-
gorized into three groups (high, medium, low) depending on
the frequency of their task-unrelated thoughts, as retrospectively
reported by them on a questionnaire upon task completion. Rela-
tive to frequent standard stimuli, they found a reduced P3 to both
the task-irrelevant novel distractor, thought to reﬂect attentional
processing of rare stimuli, as well as the task-relevant oddball
stimuli, thought to reﬂect cognitive processing in general and
maintenance of task-relevant stimuli in working memory. There-
fore,mind wandering appears to disrupt cognitive level processing
of infrequent stimuli regardless of their relevance to the ongoing
task.
Yet, it remains unclear whether the attenuating effects of mind
wandering captured by the P3 are reﬂective of the relatively impov-
erished nature of the stimuli used in these previous studies, or
whether we would observe a similar disruptive effect with affec-
tively salient stimuli while being decoupled from the external
environment. In a recent study, we examined whether the cogni-
tive analysis of naturalistic stimuli with some measure of affective
saliency changes as a function of our attention to task (Kam et al.,
2013a). Speciﬁcally, we recorded ERPs while subjects viewed pho-
tos of hands in painful or neutral situations, and reported their
attention state as “on-task” or “mind wandering” when probed
at random intervals. We then compared the ERPs to painful and
neutral images in the interval immediately preceding “on-task” vs.
“mind wandering” reports.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we observed a reduced P3 to the
painful stimuli during the interval prior to mind wandering
reports relative to on-task reports. Likewise, our second exper-
iment showed a corresponding behavioral effect, that is, a
reduction of painfulness ratings of painful stimuli during mind
wandering episodes (Kam et al., 2013b). Together, our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that mind wandering reduces our cognitive eval-
uation of external inputs even for affectively salient stimuli.
The variety of stimuli used across these studies to examine the
attenuating effects of mind wandering indicate that the associa-
tion between mind wandering and disrupted cognitive analysis
of external events appears to occur across different contextual
representations.
MIND WANDERING ATTENUATES SENSORY PROCESSING
These above ﬁndings converge on the notion that mind wander-
ing attenuates cognitive responses to visual stimuli. Nevertheless,
are these effects also observed earlier in the processing stream,
during the initial, sensory-evoked responses to external stimulus
inputs? To examine this question, we recorded ERPs while par-
ticipants performed a variation of the SART, which included two
task-irrelevant stimuli – a visual probe presented in the periph-
ery and an auditory tone. Participants were also asked to verbally
report their attention state throughout the task. We then exam-
ined the N1 (indicative of sensory processing in the auditory
domain) in response to the auditory tone, and the P1 (indicative
of sensory visual processing) in response to the visual probe as a
function of whether they preceded“on-task”or“mind wandering”
reports.
Our results indicated a reduction in sensory-evoked cortical
activity to task irrelevant probes in the interval prior to mind
wandering reports (Kam et al., 2011). Speciﬁcally, the N1 and P1,
in response to the auditory and visual probes respectively, were
both reduced during episodes of mind wandering relative to on-
task, as shown in Figure 1B. Moreover, that the ongoing task was
in the visual modality suggests that the disruptive effects of mind
wandering were not modality-speciﬁc. This ﬁnding is consistent
with two fMRI studies (Weissman et al., 2006, 2009) that found
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FIGURE 1 | Attenuation of sensory and cognitive processing during
mind wandering. (A) During decoupled thoughts, the cognitive response
to targets, as indexed by the P3 ERP component, was signiﬁcantly reduced.
(B) Similarly, the sensory processing of both auditory and visual stimuli,
as indexed by the N1 and P1 respectively, was attenuated in periods
immediately preceding mind wandering relative to on-task reports.
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reduced sensory responses in cortex to task-relevant stimuli during
brief lapses of attention.
Given a reduction in auditory sensory processing during mind
wandering states, are we also less able to detect a change in the
external stimulus in the auditory domain? In one study, partic-
ipants were asked to focus on their breath while they passively
listened to frequent and rare auditory tones (as in a passive oddball
task). They were also asked to report when they noticed they were
mindwandering (Braboszcz andDelorme, 2011). The detection of
rare auditory tones as indexed by the mismatch negativity (MMN)
component was attenuated during episodes of mind wandering
compared to episodes of on-task. That the process underlying this
MMN component is considered as automatic and pre-attentive
sensory level perception suggests that mind wandering is not only
associated with reduced sensory processing, but also a reduced
sensory detection of change in auditory perception (Braboszcz
and Delorme, 2011).
Collectively, these studies indicate that mind wandering atten-
uates the same visual sensory response in cortex that are affected
by top-down selective attention (e.g., Mangun and Hillyard, 1991;
Heinze et al., 1994; Woldorff et al., 1997). As argued by Kam et al.
(2011), this supports the notion that attentional control of sensory
processing in visual cortex is modulated by two control systems
operating in parallel (Dosenbach et al., 2008), one associated with
rapid shifts of selective visual attention (e.g., Corbetta et al., 1991;
Hopﬁnger et al., 2000), and a second one associated with slower
ﬂuctuations in task-related attention (e.g., Sonuga-Barke and
Castellanos, 2007). The attenuation of sensory responses associ-
ated with this latter form of attention is what appears to facilitate
our internal streams of thoughts during periods of decoupled
thinking, or mind wandering.
MIND WANDERING DISRUPTS ATTENTION AND MOTOR TASK
PERFORMANCE
Given that our sensory and cognitive processing of environmen-
tal stimuli attenuates during mind wandering, it is not surprising
that much behavioral evidence conﬁrms the intuition that mind
wandering disrupts our attentional systems andmotor task perfor-
mance as well. With respect to the former, the selective attention
model assumes that the spotlight is always on (e.g., Posner, 1980),
but are there times when we turn off that attentional spotlight,
for example when we are mind wandering? To address this ques-
tion, we examined whether volitional attentional functions change
as we drift in and out of mind wandering states, and if so, how
this compares to the impact of mind wandering on more reﬂexive
attentional functions (Kam et al., 2013a). Participants performed
one of two spatial orienting tasks, and we compared RTs to cued
and uncued trials as a function of the reported attention state.
As shown in Figure 2A, both forms of visual-spatial attentional
orientingwere disruptedduring episodes of mindwandering com-
pared to on-task. This ﬁnding indicates that we do indeed turn off
the attentional spotlight when we mind wander.
Based on the widespread decoupling of executive functions
from the sensory-motor environment when mind wandering,
is there also a similar disengagement of processes associated
with behavioral responses? Much evidence now converges on the
notion that mind wandering impacts behavioral performance.
FIGURE 2 | Disruption of attention and motor task performance during
mind wandering. (A) RTs were signiﬁcantly faster to cued trials compared
to uncued trials during on-task state only, suggesting attentional orienting
was disrupted during mind wandering state. This was observed in both
volitional and reﬂexive orienting tasks. (B)The tracking error, as measured
by the root mean square error, in a visuomotor tracking task was
signiﬁcantly greater during decoupled thoughts. (C) Likewise, performance
monitoring was disrupted, as indexed by a reduced fERN component,
during episodes of mind wandering compared to on-task *p < 0.05.
For instance, increased RT and errors have been reported during
periods of mind wandering (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood
et al., 2004, 2006; Cheyne et al., 2006; McVay and Kane, 2009).
In addition to the global change in RT associated with this
attentional state, Stawarczyk et al. (2011) also found an increase in
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intra-individual RT variability. Consistent with the predictions
made by Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos (2007), these ﬁndings
suggest that individuals not only respond more impulsively (as
indexed by the quicker RT) but also with less stability (as indexed
by the increased variability in RT) when we are disengaged from
the external environment.
Yet it is unclear whether this form of disengagement is a direct
consequence of disrupted attention and sensory/cognitive pro-
cessing, or whether the behavioral disengagement occurs even
when sensory and other cognitive level processing are intact. In
order to address this, we ﬁrst determined whether motor behavior
was actually disrupted during mind wandering by asking partici-
pants to track a moving target across the screen and occasionally
report their attentional state (Kam et al., 2012). The magnitude of
tracking error was then examined as a function of whether they
preceded on-task or mind wandering reports. We observed that
tracking error was in fact greater in the visuomotor task during
mind wandering relative to on-task state, as measured by root
mean squared error, as shown in Figure 2B.
To ascertain whether this effect occurred independent of dis-
ruptions earlier or later in theprocessing stream,we then examined
performance monitoring as indexed by the feedback error related
negativity (fERN) component (Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd and
Krigolson, 2007) as a function of the reported attention state.
Participants were asked to perform a time-estimation task with
trial-by-trial feedback, while we recorded their fERN to the feed-
back, and occasionally asked them to report their attention state.
We found disrupted performance monitoring, as indexed by a
reduced fERN, during episodes of mind wandering, as shown
in Figure 2C. Importantly, this effect could not be ascribed to
sensory or cognitive responses, as these responses interacted dif-
ferently with mind wandering episodes suggesting a functional
dissociation between these responses and the fERN. These results
together suggest that mind wandering disengages us from moni-
toring and adjusting our behavioral outputs independent of earlier
and later processing (Kam et al., 2012). Further, the disrupted
monitoring of our task performance appears to at least partially
account for the robust relationship observed between mind wan-
dering and performance failure in simple attention and motor
tasks.
ARE ANY NEUROCOGNITIVE FUNCTIONS PRESERVED
DURING THE DECOUPLED STATE?
Thus far, the studies we discussed suggest that both sensory and
cognitive responses are attenuated during periods of mind wan-
dering, effects that are manifest in attentional and behavioral
performance as well. Nevertheless, we seem quite capable of
responding to the external environment evenwhenourmindshave
wandered. This suggests that some aspects of attentional process-
ing of stimulus in the environment may be preserved during mind
wandering, functions that allow us to adaptively respond to stim-
uli in the external environment despite our cognitively decoupled
state.
One potential candidate is deviance detection (e.g., Näätänen
et al., 1978; Escera et al., 1998) – the extent to which we perceive
a rare or unexpected stimulus in the environment. To explore
this issue, we presented participants with task-irrelevant auditory
stimuli in the background while they read a book, and asked them
to occasionally report their attention state.We found that both fre-
quent, standard tones and infrequent, deviant tones elicited an N1
in our participants (Kam et al., 2013a). More importantly, while
the N1 in response to standard tones was greater when attention is
on-task relative tomindwandering, as would be expected based on
the aforementioned study (Kam et al., 2011), the magnitude of N1
in response to the deviant tones did not signiﬁcantly differ between
the two attentional states. This suggests that despite their irrele-
vance to the ongoing task, the sensory processing of rare, deviant
events in the environment was in fact preserved during mind wan-
dering. While this appears to stand in contrast with the ﬁndings
of disrupted deviance detection, as indexed by a reduced MMN
(Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011), several reasons may account for
this discrepancy. For example, the nature of the ongoing task, the
methodology of experience sampling and the amount of data con-
sidered to be reﬂective of the reported attentional state, are only
a few differences between these two studies that may have led to
the disparate results, all of which are detailed in the study by Kam
et al. (2013a).
These sets of ﬁndings suggest that the magnitude of sensory-
evoked cortical activity during mind wandering episodes may
be dependent upon the nature and importance of the external
stimulus. That is, if external and internal stimuli compete for exec-
utive resources (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006), much in the way
stimuli in our visual ﬁeld compete for selective spatial attention
(e.g., Posner, 1980), then perhaps there is a constant evaluation
of which stimulus is more worthy of our attention at any given
time. In particular, this is consistent with views on competition
of available resources in the context of selective attention. For
example, given a single, ﬁnite pool of attentional resources, one
model suggests that we can only attend to one stream of input at
a time, and therefore few if any resources remain for the unse-
lected input (Kahneman, 1973). Alternatively, another perspective
relates to the integrated competition hypothesis, which suggests
that visual objects compete to be represented in various neurocog-
nitive systems (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Once selected, the
perceptual processing of the selected object is prioritized by the
cooperation of multiple brain systems working together to ana-
lyze the different properties of that object (Duncan et al., 1997).
More generally, this competition process was proposed to occur
in not only the sensory domain as suggested by Desimone and
Duncan (1995), but also in the emotion and memory domains
(Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Importantly, these views apply to the competition between
internal and external inputs as well (Smallwood and Schooler,
2006). On one hand, it has been suggested that our minds
are shielded from mundane sensory events to facilitate internal
thoughts (Schooler et al., 2011). However, when an unexpected
event occurs in the environment, one that is potentially dangerous,
we may ascribe that event with higher priority and consequently
shift our attention to the external environment. Taken together,
our minds may engage in an ongoing evaluation of the impor-
tance of both external and internal stimuli; after a decision is
made, our attention is then allocated accordingly. Even when our
mind is wandering, it appears we are still clever about how we
selectively disengage from the external environment – we remain
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vigilant for deviant or unusual events thatmay require re-engaging
our neurocognitive resources with the external sensory-motor
environment.
NEUROCOGNITIVE PATHOLOGIES AND SENSORY-MOTOR
ATTENUATION
Until now, our discussion of mind wandering has concerned its
association with the attenuation of sensory-motor processing of
external stimulus inputs. As we have noted above, the effects
we review in this regard are not only consistent with the pre-
dictions of the “decoupling hypothesis” of mind wandering, but
they suggest that revisions may be in order for sensory-motor
predictions ascribed to the “executive failure hypothesis” (e.g.,
Smallwood, 2013). However, the value of reviewing the impacts
of mind wandering on sensory-motor processing goes beyond
helping clarify and inform on extant models of mind wandering
itself.
In particular, a variety of different neurocognitive disorders –
such as depression and attention deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder –
have been associated with abnormal or pathological patterns
of sensory-motor attenuation. This suggests that sensory-motor
attenuation is not necessarily speciﬁc to mind wandering itself,
but rather, reﬂects a general capacity or mechanism we have
to insulate ourselves from stimulus events in the outside world
as necessary or so desired. In the following section, we exam-
ine sensory-motor attenuation as it relates to clinical disorders
of neurocognitive function, with the goal of highlighting two
different ways in which it can be engaged in a non-normative
manner. The ﬁrst concerns the proﬁle of attenuation itself, or
the range of neurocognitive processes attenuated and the mag-
nitude of those effects. The second concerns the prevalence
of sensory-motor attenuation. Taken together, we suggest that
these two sides to abnormal sensory-motor attenuation provide a
novel perspective on an otherwise broad class of neurocognitive
pathologies.
ABNORMAL ATTENUATION PROFILE
As outlined in the ﬁrst section of our paper, when our minds wan-
der off there is an attenuation of a broad array of neurocognitive
processing of stimulus events in the external environment. Sim-
ilarly, some clinical populations have also shown attenuation of
external processing akin to that observed during mind wander-
ing states. Here, we consider the possibility that certain clinical
conditions and mind wandering states may engage a common
mechanism of sensory-motor attenuation, a possibility that aligns
not just with observations of attenuation itself, but its associa-
tion with activation of the brain’s default mode network (DMN;
e.g., Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Greicius et al., 2003). Speciﬁ-
cally, not only has the DMN been shown to up-regulate activity
during mind wandering (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al.,
2009; Kirschner et al., 2012), but this up-regulation has been asso-
ciated with down-regulation of activity in sensory cortices (e.g.,
Weissman et al., 2006). While abnormally heightened levels of
DMN activity have been well-recognized in various clinical popu-
lations (e.g., Tian et al., 2006; Chai et al., 2011), here we stress their
potential links to sensory-motor attenuation. While the associa-
tions we draw out remain admittedly speculative, by considering
how patterns of sensory-motor attenuation may systematically
vary with patterns of DMN activity, we may gain newfound
leverage in our ability to understand both normal and pathological
neurocognitive function.
On the one hand, ADHD is a psychiatric disorder character-
ized by inattention, hyperactivity and restlessness. Traditionally,
one neuropsychological model of ADHD proposed that deﬁcits
of executive functions play an important role in the symptom
manifestation of this disorder (e.g., Barkley, 1997; Willcutt et al.,
2005). This model was supported by evidence of impaired per-
formance on executive function tasks found in ADHD patients
(e.g., Faraone and Biederman, 1998; Willcutt et al., 2005). Yet,
not all ADHD patients exhibit executive function deﬁcits, indi-
cating that these deﬁcits can explain but are not necessary for
the symptoms to occur (e.g., Castellanos et al., 2006). If so, what
else might account for the impairment of sustained attention in
ADHD?
One hypothesis is that it may reﬂect functional abnormal-
ities in the DMN; (Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007). For
example, ADHD patients showed greater functional connectiv-
ity among regions within the DMN during rest as measured
by fMRI (Tian et al., 2006), evidence suggesting a hyperactive
default mode. Likewise, ADHD patients also showed greater
variability in performance measures (Castellanos et al., 2005;
Klein et al., 2006), which has been proposed to index atten-
tional lapses in task performance (Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos,
2007). Collectively, these observations suggest comparatively
higher levels of activity within DMN in patients diagnosed with
ADHD.
Despite a hyperactive DMN however, ADHD patients showed
a heightened propensity for distraction by external stimuli (e.g.,
Arnsten, 2006; Fassbender et al., 2009). From the perspective
of sensory-motor attenuation, this suggests that there may be
a reduction in the magnitude and/or extent of sensory-motor
attenuation during DMN activation, relative to non-psychiatric
populations. For example, whereas deviance detection stands out
as the sole primary neurocognitive function identiﬁed to date
that appears to be relatively preserved during mind wandering
states (Kam et al., 2013a), the proﬁle of “preserved” neurocog-
nitive functions in individuals diagnosed with ADHD may be
broader in extent and/or greater in magnitude than what has
been normatively deﬁned. Again, although speculative, this pos-
sibility represents a clinically-important hypothesis for future
investigation.
Critically, however, abnormal proﬁles of sensory-motor atten-
uation – including both the range of neurocognitive processes
involved and the magnitude of their attenuation – are not theo-
retically limited to less attenuation than what is normative. From
a clinical standpoint, there could be pathologies tied to increased
sensory-motor attenuation relative to non-clinical or mind wan-
dering norms, a possibility that aligns with what has already been
observed in some clinical populations.
In schizophrenia, for instance, hyperactivity and hyperconnec-
tivity have both been observed in the DMN (Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli
et al., 2009; Ongür et al., 2010; Chai et al., 2011), akin to what has
been found in ADHD patients. Yet at the same time, schizophre-
nia patients also show reduced top-down attentional modulation
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of external auditory signals, such that sensory-evoked N1 ERP
responses are attenuated relative to non-psychiatric controls (e.g.,
O’Donnell et al., 1994; Salisbury et al., 2010). While to date these
twoﬁndings have not been directly linked, they raise the possibility
that this clinical population may show a broader array of sensory-
motor attenuation effects, and/or a greater magnitude of these
effects, relative to non-psychiatric norms. Regardless of whether
that proves to be the case, the critical point is that the same gen-
eral mechanism of sensory-motor attenuation engaged by mind
wandering is also implicated in at least one class of neurocognitive
disorders; further, these population-speciﬁc patterns of sensory-
motor attenuation may be an important – and heretofore under-
appreciated – functional biomarker of the given neurocognitive
pathology.
ABNORMAL ATTENUATION PREVALENCE
Beyond mapping the proﬁle of neurocognitive processes subject
to sensory-motor attenuation during mind wandering and the
magnitude of those effects, a second clinically relevant aspect of
attenuation is in the prevalence of its engagement, or the pro-
portion of waking hours spent attenuating the neurocognitive
processing of the outside world. Normatively speaking, indi-
viduals report mind wandering almost half the time, regardless
of whether its frequency is measured in the lab or a “real-
world” setting (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Klinger, 2009;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Further, within the amount
of time spent mind wandering, thoughts containing fantasy ele-
ments seem to occur about 25% of the time (Klinger and Cox,
1987). Here we consider systematic deviations in these normative
prevalence rates as they relate to two different clinical popula-
tions, both of which concern identiﬁed abnormalities in decoupled
thinking.
First, a pair of recent studies have proposed that a subset
of the “normal” population engages in what can be described
as excessive and/or compulsive fantasizing (Schupak and Rosen-
thal, 2009; Bigelsen and Schupak, 2011), or whimsical thoughts
having content that is unlikely to occur or ever play out in
the real world (Klinger and Cox, 1987). To these individuals,
fantasizing occupies much of their personal life, and is seen com-
parable to an addiction. The content of their fantasies varies
widely, but they fall under two main categories of those that
are driven by ﬁctional characters and those that involve the
self in an aspirational context. Independent of the content, the
fantasies are characterized by an intricate and elaborate level
of detail (Schupak and Rosenthal, 2009; Bigelsen and Schupak,
2011). While they are fully aware that these fantasies are not
real and are generally able to refrain from engaging in their fan-
tasy world during work or school, they ﬁnd the compulsion to
indulge these fantasies uncontrollable when they are alone. The
lack of control over their fantasy not only differentiates them
from ‘healthy’ individuals, but also contributes to their distress
over issues of time diverted from social activity and important
relationships.
From a sensory-motor attenuation perspective, compulsive
fantasy thus represents a deviation from the norm with respect
to the prevalence rate of attenuation. Regardless of whether one
is intentionally down-regulating the processing of external stimuli
versus simply indulging one’s proclivity for fantasy, the byproduct
is that compulsive fantasizers are engaging sensory-motor attenu-
ation at rates that deviate from normative patterns. Moreover, to
the extent that such decoupled thinking may in fact be addictive
in this population (Schupak and Rosenthal, 2009; Bigelsen and
Schupak, 2011), it raises the question of whether sensory-motor
attenuation itself may be integral to the rewarding experience.
That is, the addictive aspect of fantasizing may be as much about
removing oneself from the outside world as it is about the actual
fantasy playing out in one’s head.
A second clinical condition that can be seen as manifesting
an abnormal prevalence rate for sensory-motor attenuation is
major depressive disorder (MDD), a psychological disorder that is
characterized by low mood, such as sadness, anxiety and helpless-
ness, and a reduced level of physical activity, such as inability to
sleep, or excessive eating. Of relevance, individuals experiencing
depression have the tendency to ruminate in negative thoughts
(e.g., Spasojevic and Alloy, 2001; Watkins and Teasdale, 2001),
which in turn leads to negative moods. Given the vicious cycle
of negative moods and negative thoughts (e.g., Segerstrom et al.,
2000; Disner et al., 2011), the interaction between cognition and
emotion appears to contribute to the symptoms of rumination
in this disorder. Importantly, the tendency to perpetually engage
in negative thoughts in depressed individuals suggests that they
may show increased decoupling from the external environment,
or an abnormal amount of time spent engaging sensory-motor
attenuation.
Consistent with this possibility, depressed individuals showed
increased activity and connectivity within the DMN (Greicius
et al., 2007; Sheline et al., 2010). Moreover, several common symp-
toms of depression – lethargy and aversion to physical and social
activity – also fall in line with this, as they reﬂect a decrease in
engagement with the external environment. This population may
also be characterized by impaired effortful task-related processing
(Hartlage et al., 1993) – a problem that seems to be speciﬁcally
induced by rumination (Watkins and Brown, 2002). These reports
collectively suggest that depressed individuals are more likely to
be in the default state, and once engaged, are more likely to
stay there. This may be especially true for individuals with more
severe symptoms and have become dysfunctional in their daily
lives.
Taken together, compulsive fantasy and depression thus both
appear to reﬂect an abnormal prevalence of the engagement of
sensory-motor attenuation. While it is important to consider
these neurocognitive pathologies in the context of attenuation
proﬁles, there are clearly other factors involved speciﬁc to the
disorder that lead some people to compulsively fantasize and
others to uncontrollably ruminate. For example, emotion plays
a crucial role in depression, while executive function capacities
appear to contribute to ADHD and personality differences may
modulate the severity of compulsive fantasies. The interaction
between these factors and decoupling abnormalities may together
account for more variability in the symptom manifestation and
severity of each disorder. These ﬁndings highlight the value of
considering subjective experiences in understanding the neu-
ral processes underlying clinical syndromes and neurocognitive
pathologies.
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SUMMARY
In summary, our review emphasizes that decoupled thoughts are
facilitated andmaintained through an attenuation of a broad array
of neurocognitive systems that are involved in responding to the
sensory-motor environment. This attenuation serves the impor-
tant purpose of buffering our internal trains of thoughts from
external distractions andallowingone to fully engage inourdecou-
pled thoughts, be they “normal” everyday content or be tied to a
neurocognitive pathology such as major depression. We now turn
to several points of consideration and future directions.
POINTS OF CONSIDERATION
SUBJECTIVE REPORTS OF ATTENTION
While subjective verbal reports provide a straightforward mea-
sure of one’s attentional state, a commonly raised concern with
this particular method is that it may increase the risk of demand
characteristics, and thereby potentially affecting the validity of
the reports. There are several reasons why this concern may
not be warranted. First, the proportion of on-task vs. mind
wandering reports have been relatively consistent across studies
regardless of the methodology used, whether participants pro-
vided a response verbally or through button press (Smallwood
et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Kam et al., 2011; Kirschner
et al., 2012). Second, several lines of research converge on sys-
tematic differences between these two attention states. These
studies have revealed reliable differences in activation of neu-
ral regions (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Christoff,
2012), electrocortical processing of external stimuli (O’Connell
et al., 2009; Barron et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2011, 2012), ocu-
lar patterns (Reichle et al., 2010; Schad et al., 2012), as well as
behavioral performance (Smallwood et al., 2004, 2006; Kam et al.,
2013a). As with any subjective measures in other areas of research,
the possibility of demand characteristics remain; nevertheless,
that demand characteristics alone may have contributed to the
patterns of ﬁndings across mind wandering studies seem highly
unlikely.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK AND MIND
WANDERING
The DMN is a resting state network of regions that includes the
precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex
and bilateral temporoparietal junction, and has been shown to be
more active at rest than during task performance (e.g., Gusnard
and Raichle, 2001; Greicius et al., 2003). The functional signiﬁ-
cance of the DMN includes its role in self-referential thought (e.g.,
Northoff et al., 2006; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011) and auto-
biographical memory retrieval (Svoboda et al., 2006; Kim, 2012).
Given thatmindwandering periods have been associatedwith acti-
vations of the DMN (Christoff et al., 2009; Kirschner et al., 2012),
to what extent can research in DMN inform us about the func-
tions of mind wandering? For instance, given the aforementioned
roles of DMN and its relationship with mind wandering, one
may speculate that we tend to engage in self-referential thoughts
or autobiographical memory retrieval during mind wandering.
Undoubtedly, more studies are necessary to determine the extent
to which we can draw inferences about mind wandering based on
research ﬁndings of DMN.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
IS DECOUPLING AN INCIDENTAL OR NECESSARY PROCESS?
An important issue regarding the decoupling process concerns
whether its occurrence is incidental or necessary. On the one hand,
perceptual decoupling is thought to be necessary to support the
continuity of internal thoughts (Smallwood, 2013). In contrast,
Franklin et al. (2013) question the extent to which perceptual
decoupling needs to be actively engaged to insulate these inner
thoughts. While this debate is beyond the scope of this review,
the literature we presented here appears to support the notion
that an attenuation of external processing is necessary for the
facilitation and maintenance of our internal trains of thoughts.
This is in line with the notion that our executive resources are
ﬁnite, which presumably limits the amount of stimuli we can
attend to at any given point in time (Smallwood and Schooler,
2006).
WHAT IS THE TIME COURSE OF MIND WANDERING AND ITS
ASSOCIATED ATTENUATION?
An important and related question regarding the mechanism
underlying this sensory motor attenuation concerns the tempo-
ral characteristic/order of internal thoughts and attenuation of
external environment. That is, does the internal thought appear
in consciousness ﬁrst, and then the attenuation follows? Or does
the attenuation occur ﬁrst in order for the internal thought to
creep into consciousness? This issue relates to a recent theoretical
paper proposing a distinction between occurrence and process of
self-generated thought (Smallwood, 2013). Speciﬁcally, the pro-
cess that initiates an episode of self-generated thought is different
from the process that maintains the integrity of that thought.
Given Smallwood’s (2013) proposal that attenuation of external
processing occurs to maintain the continuity of internal thoughts,
one would predict the attenuation follows the initiation of the
thought. However, this question remains to be empirically tested.
To address this question would require the identiﬁcation of the
onset of internal thoughts and the temporal characteristic of the
attenuation.
CAN WE PREDICT AN INDIVIDUAL’S ATTENTIONAL STATE ONLINE?
Our research has shown that mind wandering is associated with
changes in our neural responses to external events. Speciﬁcally, we
found reductions in both sensory and cognitive level processing of
external stimuli during periods of mind wandering (Smallwood
et al., 2008; Kam et al., 2011), a disruptive effect of mind wan-
dering that has been conﬁrmed by other studies (O’Connell et al.,
2009; Barron et al., 2011; Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011). Given
these relatively stable neural signatures of mind wandering, can
we reliably predict an individual’s attentional state based on their
neural response in the moment?
One approach is to ﬁrst establish a neural marker of mind
wandering speciﬁc to the individual. That marker can then be
used as an indicator of mind wandering when evaluating neural
responses in real time on an individual-by-individual basis. That
is, one could presumably compare whether the current incoming
neural response matches the neural markers of mind wandering
for that particular individual to determine whether their attention
was focused externally or internally in real time.
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Based on a similar approach, preliminary evidence has revealed
that speciﬁc patterns of RTs during reading can be used to
predict attention states online at the individual level (Franklin
et al., 2013). Although these behavioral patterns are speciﬁc to
the context of mindless reading, they nevertheless suggest the
possibility of predicting one’s attention state in real time, with-
out the need of individuals’ subjective reports. Therefore, future
efforts need to be directed toward identifying neural markers to
predict attentional states rather than simply characterizing neu-
ral responses associated with subjectively reported attentional
states.
IS THERE A NEURAL NETWORK THAT REGULATES THESE ATTENTIONAL
FLUCTUATIONS?
Both theoretical models (Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007)
and empirical evidence (Smallwood et al., 2004, 2008; Christoff
et al., 2009; Kam et al., 2011) point to the existence of slow
ﬂuctuations of attention between inner thoughts and external
environment. There are two main stages involved in these ﬂuc-
tuations, the processing of which seem to require the effort of
a superordinate system. First, given that internal and external
inputs are always competing for executive resources (Small-
wood and Schooler, 2006), the importance of each stream is
evaluated and compared. Second, the stream deemed as more
important presumably enters consciousness. As distinct as these
experiences are, the transition between these attention states
at times appear to be seamless. So is there a network of
regions that regulates this evaluative process and facilitates the
transitions?
One potential candidate is the salience network, comprised
of the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex, which was
proposed to distinguish the most salient stimuli among inter-
nal and external inputs in order to guide behavior (Menon and
Uddin,2010). Consistentwith the abovemodel, the frontal parietal
network (FPN), which consists of the rostrolateral and dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex, precuneus, and the anterior inferior parietal lobule, has
also been proposed to serve a similar function (Smallwood et al.,
2012). This network of regions was suggested to act as a “global
workspace” (Baars, 1988), which adjudicates between internal
stimuli and external stimuli competing for access to consciousness
(Smallwood et al., 2012). Of relevance, the FPN was hypothe-
sized to work with the DMN in facilitating internally directed
thoughts by protecting them from disruptions by the external
environment. Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from
neuroimaging research showing that parts of the FPN were acti-
vated during periods of mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009).
Taken together, emerging evidence suggests that these networks
are potential candidates as regulatory bodies of attentional ﬂuctu-
ations; nevertheless, the exact function of these networks as well
as the direction of causality between these networks and the DMN
is yet to be determined.
WHY DO WE MIND WANDER?
Much of our discussion of mind wandering concerns its dis-
ruptive effects on processing of external stimuli resulting from
decoupling our executive resources from the environment. This
disengagement from the external world plays an important role:
it allows us to focus in our inner world. But what exactly is the
purpose of engaging in our own trains of thoughts?
Several lines of research have shed light on the functionalities
of mind wandering. For example, both task-unrelated thoughts
and the DMN have been positively associated with levels of cre-
ativity (Baird et al., 2012; Ellamil et al., 2012). In particular, the
greatest improvement in creativity test performance was observed
in the experimental condition that elicited highest levels of mind
wandering (Baird et al., 2012). This ﬁnding suggests that periods
of mind wandering may act as incubation intervals necessary for
creative solutions to be generated, a positive feature that highlights
the potential value of mind wandering.
Moreover, the thoughts that individuals engage in tend to be
oriented toward the future (Smallwood et al., 2011). Consistent
with this ﬁnding, the neural regions implicated in future thinking
(Schacter et al., 2007) overlap with regions associated with mind
wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009). Interestingly,
a signiﬁcant portion of the content of our inner trains of thoughts
has been associated with our current concerns (Klinger and Cox,
1987). This pair of ﬁndings suggests that thoughts about cur-
rent concerns during mind wandering may be used to plan future
behavior.
In addition, mind wandering may restore attentional capacity
by offering an escape from the task at hand. Based on the Atten-
tion Restorative Theory, effortful attention can become exhausted
over time in an urban environment, but can be restored in an
environment that facilitates “fascination” or effortless attention
(Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989). For example, a natural environ-
ment has been rated as highly effective in restoring attention
(Herzog et al., 1997), an effect that was conﬁrmed by ﬁndings that
a walk in nature allows for recovery of directed attentional abili-
ties (Berman et al., 2008). While a walk in nature may not always
be plausible, might a “mental walk” away from the current task
provide a similar albeit potentially smaller effect of attentional
restoration?
Accordingly, it appears that mind wandering is not only asso-
ciated with costs but also with beneﬁts, (e.g., Smallwood and
Andrews-Hanna, 2013), an issue that seems to depend on the
context in which it occurs, as determined by a host of variables
that transcend the actual attenuation itself. While these adap-
tive features of mind wandering shed light on its functionalities,
they do not directly address the question of the purpose of mind
wandering. Both theoretical models, perhaps from an evolution-
ary standpoint, and future research are necessary to elucidate the
purpose of this ubiquitous experience.
IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONTROL THESE FLUCTUATIONS OF ATTENTION? IF
SO, HOW?
Despite the negative connotations commonly associated with
mind wandering, its aforementioned functionalities make it
apparent that the issue is not in the experience itself, but instead
lies in the control over the occurrence and duration of this expe-
rience. That is, if we engage in our own thoughts in a safe
environment when disrupting the task at hand is not detrimen-
tal, then mind wandering can afford multiple adaptive functions.
Accordingly, it appears that being in control of when and for how
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long to mind wander is the key to capitalizing on its bene-
ﬁts while avoiding its disruptive effects. Several approaches that
have recently emerged with the aim to enhance the control over
one’s attention include mindfulness training and biofeedback.
Preliminary evidence suggests that mindfulness training does
indeed improve one’s sustained attention (Jha et al., 2007; Tang
et al., 2007). Notably, additional research is needed to determine
whether these techniques only prolong attention once engaged, or
whether they actually allow us to exert explicit control over what
enters consciousness.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, decoupled thoughts are associated with an atten-
uation of neurocognitive systems involved in processing stimuli
in the external sensory-motor environment in order to adaptively
guide our behavior. That these decoupled thoughts occupy much
of our awake time, and are tied to a variety of neurocognitive func-
tions highlight the importance of research in mind wandering.
Future studies are necessary to understand better these tempo-
ral ﬂuctuations of attention, as they are vital to both normal and
pathological neurocognitive functioning.
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